













































                                                
1 Thanks to Bronwyn Finnigan, Jonardon Ganeri, Christopher Mole, and Carlos Montemayor for their helpful 










































                                                
2 Perhaps worth mentioning is that my own, opposing view is that the distinction between active and passive 
attention both tracks reality and indicates the existence of a self (Jennings 2012, Jennings 2017, Jennings 
forthcoming). 
3 The “concomitants” of consciousness are the parts of consciousness that are: “co-emergent,” “co-dependent,” 





























































































                                                
5 I am setting aside here the secondary visual channels that bypass V1, as are supposed to be active in blindsight.   
psychologically	and	morally	pernicious”	(310).	I	disagree	with	this	way	of	thinking	about	the	
self	(Jennings	2017,	Jennings	forthcoming).	Yet,	Ganeri’s	position	is	a	powerful	alternative	
to,	as	he	puts	it,	the	“philosophia-falsafah	tradition”	(15).	My	puzzle	with	anatta	is	in	
understanding	how	its	target	is	distinct	from	mano	or	“mind,”	as	interpreted	by	Ganeri.	
	
Ganeri	summarizes	the	standard	Buddhist	argument	for	anatta	as	follows:	“being	at	the	
centre	of	an	organized	arena	of	experience	and	action	is	a	property	not	of	a	real	but	at	best	
of	a	virtual	entity,	which	as	such	cannot	have	any	causal	powers;	so	the	self	cannot	be	an	
agent”	(1).	This	argument	should	be	familiar	to	those	who	have	been	exposed	to	Dennett’s	
work	on	self	as	“center	of	narrative	gravity”	(Dennett	2014).	But	why	should	we	think	of	the	
self	as	“the	centre	of	an	organized	arena	of	experience”	in	the	first	place?	This	appears	to	be	
based	on	the	presumption	that	the	self	must	occur	within	the	“space	of	experience”	or	citta:	
“At	its	centre	there	is	neither	an	agent,	presented	as	producing	the	centred	array,	nor	a	
witness	passively	observing	the	display”	(9).		
	
Against	this	presumption,	another	possibility	is	that	the	self	just	is	citta,	an	idea	Ganeri	
ascribes	to	Rune	Johansson	(329).	Yet,	Ganeri	thinks	this	view	is	consistent	with	the	denial	
of	self,	or	anatta,	since	citta	is	not	an	agent	(330).	My	puzzle	is	how	to	square	the	claim	that	
citta	is	not	an	agent	with	the	idea	that	citta	is	“one	in	meaning”	with	mano,	or	“mind”:	
“consciousness	is	referred	to	as	citta	in	the	context	of	perceptual	experience	and	as	mano	
(‘mind’)	in	the	context	of	cognitive	control”	(73).	My	puzzle	stems	from	the	fact	that	
cognitive	control	is	typically	linked	to	the	“central	executive,”	which	is	explicitly	rejected	by	
Ganeri	as	a	homunculus	(207).	What	are	the	properties	of	citta	that	allow	it	to	provide	
cognitive	control	but	prevent	it	from	being	a	central	executive	or	agent?	
	
One	of	the	properties	of	citta	that	struck	me	as	similar	to	the	central	executive	it	that	it	is	
active	when	it	has	an	attentional	task	and	is	otherwise	in	a	passive	“default”	mode	(45).	
Compare	this	with	the	observed	trade-off	between	the	central	executive	and	default	mode	
networks:	“Cognitively	demanding	tasks	that	evoke	activation	in	the	brain's	central-
executive	network	(CEN)	have	been	consistently	shown	to	evoke	decreased	activation	
(deactivation)	in	the	default-mode	network	(DMN)”	(Sridharan	et	al.	2007).	Further,	Ganeri	
claims	that	citta	leaves	the	default	mode	when	triggered	by	a	salient	stimulus	(188),	just	as	
the	switch	between	the	central	executive	and	default	modes	has	been	found	to	be	
regulated	by	“the	rFIC,	a	key	node	of	the	SN	[salience	network]”	(Sridharan	et	al.	
2007).	Finally,	just	as	citta	is	responsible	for	cognitive	control	in	Ganeri’s	model,	the	central	
executive	is	“important	for	multiple	cognitive	control	functions,	including	initiation,	
maintenance,	and	adjustment	of	attention”	(Sridharan	et	al.	2007).		
	
Not	only	does	citta	share	many	of	the	characteristics	of	the	central	executive,	it	is	said	by	
Ganeri	to	be	“emergent”	(“a	unified	emergent	dynamical	system”)	at	least	when	in	the	
active	state	(37).	This	seems	to	open	the	door	to	the	possibility	that	citta	has	new	powers	
and	properties	in	this	state,	such	as	those	of	the	global	workspace,	which	Ganeri	ties	to	citta	
(212).	The	global	workspace,	for	example,	is	said	to	allow	for	“the	spontaneous	generation	
of	intentional	behavior”	(Dehaene	&	Naccache	2001).	Yet,	Ganeri	sees	this	emergence	as	
occurring	only	at	the	level	of	description:	“A	conscious	mental	life	is,	at	another	level	of	
description,	the	activity	of	a	set	of	cognitive	modules.	Only	having	reached	this	point,	and	
not	before,	can	the	question	of	strong	first-personal	phenomena	be	raised	and	addressed”	
(322).	He	describes	the	maintenance	of	the	boundary	as	“apophatic	rather	than	forensic”	
(4).	The	puzzle	I	find	myself	left	with	is	how	we	can	be	sure	that	the	emergence	of	citta	is	
limited	in	this	way.	It	seems	natural	to	me	to	see	an	emergent	system	that	allows	for	
cognitive	control	as	having	distinct	metaphysical	status;	in	my	own	view,	the	self	is	an	
unified	emergent	dynamical	system	that	directs	attention,	and	we	should	see	it	as	having	
independent	metaphysical	status	due	to	powers	of	attention	we	only	get	through	the	
emergence	of	this	system	(Jennings	forthcoming).	Those	powers	are	best	summed	up,	I	
think,	through	the	standard	division	of	active	from	passive	attention.	Our	views	are	thus	at	
odds	on	this	point,	and	I	am	not	sure	why	Ganeri	has	removed	this	sort	of	view	from	the	
table.		
	
Finally,	according	to	Ganeri,	the	claim	that	the	concept	of	self	is	not	just	wrongheaded	but	
morally	pernicious	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	self	is	rooted	in	the	past,	and	so	“insensitive	
to	evidence”:	“The	false	belief	that	I	am	my	will	prevents	any	question	of	disidentifying	by	
disattending	even	from	arising,	which	is	why	craving	is	what	being	in	the	grip	of	the	myth	of	
self	as	detached	from	experience	entails”	(313).	Yet,	citta	is	also	rooted	in	the	past:	“the	
ethical	profile	of	a	mind,	the	influence	of	past	ethical	conduct,	bears	on	attentional	
selection”	(198).	Why	is	it	that	being	rooted	in	the	past	is	positive	or	neutral	in	the	case	of	
citta	but	negative	in	the	case	of	self?	
	
To	sum	up,	ekaggatā	and	anatta,	both	crucial	elements	of	Ganeri’s	overall	view,	seem	to	me	
to	face	some	further	challenges.	It	may	be	that	Ganeri	already	has	the	resources	to	face	
them,	either	in	this	book	or	in	other	work,	and	I	welcome	the	opportunity	to	learn	more	
about	his	important	project.		
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